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Abstract: 
The relationship between comparative law and the field of economics is 
increasingly important, but controversial. In the legal origins literature, 
economists have drawn from comparative law scholarship to suggest that 
common law systems may be more conducive to financial and economic 
development than civil law systems. Yet comparativists have been skeptical of 
the use of legal families to explain economic outcomes. After reviewing the 
discussion of legal families in the disciplines of comparative law, on the one 
hand, and economics, on the other, we conclude that a more nuanced 
approach is advisable. At the same time, we urge comparativists to engage in 
this debate more actively. 
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The discussion about the relative comparative advantages of civil law 
over common law and vice-versa, or statutory law over judge-made law 
or vice-versa, has a long intellectual pedigree. From Sir Fortescue’s 
1475 opus to Jeremy Bentham, Max Weber, and Friedrich Hayek, 
scholars have presented competing views about the benefits of these 
different systems of legal adjudication and decision-making.1 Both the 
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1 See Sir J Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (In Praise of the Laws of England) 
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U.K. and the U.S witnessed a significant and intense debate over the 
advantages of codifying the common law in the nineteenth century.2 In 
the last decades, however, a series of empirical works has reignited this 
debate by providing new evidence that the common law system is more 
conducive to the development of financial markets – and perhaps even 
to economic growth – than the civil law system, especially that of 
French origin. 3  Although highly controversial, this perspective has 
become popular in academia as well as in policy circles (in particular, 
under the auspices of some programs associated with the World Bank) 
under the designation of “legal origins theory.”4  
 
The literature on legal origins sought to contribute to the 
understanding of the relationship between law and economic 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(CUP 1825), defending the superior properties of English law compared to Roman 
law); J Bentham, ‘Law as It Is’, in J Browning (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 
5 (William Tait 1843), criticizing the unpredictable and arbitrary character of 
decisions by common law judges); M Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1 (University of California Press 1978), attributing the 
persistence of the common law in England to special interest pressure from lawyers’ 
guilds, despite the “rational form of Roman law” and the “technically superior 
training of Roman-law jurists”; F Hayek,  Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New 
Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (Routledge & Kegan 
1973): “the ideal of individual liberty seems to have flourished chiefly among people 
where, at least for long periods, judge-made law predominated”. 
2 See discussion by N Garoupa and A P Morriss, ‘The Fable of the Codes: The 
Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal Origins and Codification Movements’ (2012) 5 
University of Illinois Law Review 1443-1497. 
3 For a review of this literature, see R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes and A Shleifer, 
‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Economic 
Literature 285-332. Even though this literature has identified correlations between 
legal origin and a number of regulatory and economic outcomes, the link between 
legal tradition and economic growth is certainly more tenuous. Paul Mahoney, the 
author of the main study identifying a direct relationship between legal origin and 
economic growth has backed off from this claim in subsequent work. See P 
Mahoney, ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’ (2001) 
30(2) Journal of Legal Studies 503-25, finding that “common-law countries 
experienced faster economic growth than civil law countries during the period 
1960–92”. Cf see D Klerman, P Mahoney, H Spamann, and M Weinstein, ‘Legal 
Origin or Colonial History?’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Legal Analysis 379-409, finding 
that “that the identity of the colonizer is indeed a better predictor of post-colonial 
growth rates than legal origin”.  
4 See, among others, V Grosswald Curran, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Origins 
Thesis: [N]on Scholae Sed Vitae Discimus’ (2009) 57 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 863-80.   
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development. Inaugurated in the mid-1990s by economist Andrei 
Shleifer and his co-authors (which came to be known by the acronym 
LLSV), the originality of this line of work was twofold.5  First, the 
authors employed quantitative methods to compare a multitude of 
legal systems to a greater extent than their predecessors.6  Second, 
LLSV relied heavily on the categories devised by comparative law 
scholars to overcome the endogeneity problem that plagues most 
attempts to determine the causal relationship between law on the one 
hand, and economic outcomes on the other. That is, in view of the 
statistical correlation (as shown by many studies) between “effective” 
legal institutions and economic development, one may be tempted to 
conclude that law causes economic development. 7  However, the 
reverse is equally plausible, with effective legal institutions being a 
superior good whose desirability increases as countries become richer.8  
 
In LLSV’s model, legal rules and institutions derived from certain 
legal families, which, in turn, resulted from involuntary processes of 
conquest and colonization that took place in the distant past.9 Legal 
families could therefore be deemed to be exogenous, which permitted 
the authors to conclude that legal institutions had a causal impact on 
economic outcomes, and not the other way around.10 Although the first 
                                                            
5 For the first and most-cited work in this literature, see R La Porta, F Lopez de 
Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6)  Journal of 
Political Economy 1113-150. 
6  For a discussion of the benefits and pitfalls of quantitative methods, see H 
Spamann, 'Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law?' 
(2009) 7(4)  American Journal of Comparative Law 5797-810. A recent survey 
summarizes forty-nine scholarly articles on this matter (with around two-thirds 
proposing empirical evidence to support the legal origins claim; G Xu, ‘The Role of 
Law in Economic Growth: A Literature Review’ (2011) 25 Journal of Economic 
Surveys 833-871). 
7 There are in the literature significant controversies concerning the concept and 
measurement of “effective” institutions. 
8 See, among others, D Klerman, 'Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and 
Economic Development'  (2007) 19(2) Pacific McGeorge Global Business & 
Development Law Journal 427-434.  
9 R La Porta et al. base their approach to legal systems on Alan Watson's theory of 
legal transplants. Their influential article on “Law and Finance” begins by citing 
Alan Watson and taking as its starting point “the recognition that laws in different 
countries are not written from scratch, but rather transplanted.” R La Porta, F 
Lopez de Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6)  Journal 
of Political Economy 1113-150. 
10 The alleged “exogeneity” of legal families has been disputed. The process of 
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studies in this literature used legal families as an instrumental variable 
in two-stage regressions, later studies abandoned that approach, as 
they increasingly understood that legal families had a direct and 
independent effect on the variables of interest.11  
 
The rapidly-expanding legal origins theory now relates conventional 
legal-family classifications to major economic variables and relevant 
puzzles in the development literature (e.g. why some countries grow 
successfully and others do not, why there is a trap for middle-income 
countries, which legal institutions are important in explaining 
successful and unsuccessful reforms12). At the same time, significant 
developments on the finance literature have taken place (in this case, 
under the original name of “law and finance”). There are now 
empirical studies employing legal families to explain cross-country 
variation in issues as diverse as labor markets regulation, entry 
restrictions, government ownership of banks and the media, and 
military conscription.13  
 
The initial works by LLSV provided no clear theory. Later works by 
these and other authors have conceptualized two potential mechanisms 
to explain the empirical patterns observed by LLSV.14 The first one, 
the so-called “adaptability channel” proposes that the common law is 
more effective in promoting financial markets (and possibly economic 
growth) because common law judges have more power to adapt the law 
                                                                                                                                                                           
colonization was not historically random. The United Kingdom defeated all other 
European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Therefore, the British 
Empire resulted from those areas of the world that the United Kingdom understood 
as more valuable in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. If so, the current 
common law jurisdictions were partially determined by economic variables (namely 
perceived resources) and not the output of a random process.  
11 R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Economic Literature 285-332, p 298: “even if 
instrumental variable techniques are inappropriate because legal origin influences 
finance through channels other than rules protecting investors, legal origins are still 
exogenous, and to the extent that they shape legal rules protecting investors, these 
rules cannot be just responding to market development”. 
12 See generally discussion by M Trebilcock and M Prado, What Makes Poor Countries 
Poor? Institutional Determinants of Development (Edward Elgar 2012). 
13 R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Economic Literature 285-332. 
14 See generally T Beck, A Demirgüç-Kunt and R Levine, ‘Law and Finance: Why 
Does Legal Origin Matter?’ (2003) 31(4)  Journal of Comparative Economics 653-75. 
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to economic needs. At the same time, civil law judges are supposedly 
more constrained by codified principles. Comprehensive statutory 
codification undermines judicial ability to make law in new 
circumstances and where economic needs are pervasive. The 
“adaptability channel” evidently echoes the so-called efficiency of the 
common law hypothesis, a point we will explore later. 
 
The second suggested mechanism has been known to be the “political 
channel”. Here the argument is that the common law emphasizes 
private property rights and contractual approaches while the civil law 
gives a greater play to social or collective rights and mandatory rules. 
As a consequence, common law courts are more independent and 
more effective in restraining state expropriation, while civil law courts 
are presumably weak in constraining executive power. In this 
reasoning, the efficiency of the common law hypothesis is implicit; it 
only makes sense if courts are better than legislators at promoting law 
more conducive to economic growth.  
 
As others have recognized, these two mechanisms are actually the 
same.15 The “adaptability channel” only works if the “political channel” 
exists. Moreover, these two potential channels are introduced as 
exogenous mechanisms while, in fact, they are endogenous to the 
political process. In this light, these channels are themselves shaped by 
economic and social outcomes. If so, we might have an argument for 
reverse causality which inevitably undermines the alleged theoretical 
argument. 
 
Nevertheless, the very application of economic methodology to legal 
family categories is subject to significant difficulties. We will focus 
here on the serious methodological critique of this line of work, which 
reflects both conceptual and empirical concerns about the distinction 
between common law on one hand, and French, German and 
Scandinavian civil law systems on the other. 
 
The Article goes as follows. The following section describes the rise 
and decline of legal family categories in comparative law scholarship. 
The goal is both to understand the promise of their use in economic 
models and the reasons behind comparativists’ resistance to the legal 
                                                            
15  See J Reitz, 'Toward a Study of the Ecology of Judicial Activism' (2009) 59 
University of Toronto Law Journal 185-196. 
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origins theory. By highlighting the historical contingency of legal-
family distinctions, the intellectual history of legal families casts doubt 
on their use as instrumental variables. This analysis also shows that the 
legal origins theory emerged in the economic literature precisely when 
comparative law scholars were growing skeptical about the continued 
relevance of these categories which, in turn, might explain the lack of 
interest in the topic they have largely shown so far. In section three, we 
then summarize the main critiques of the premises, methods, and 
conclusions of the legal origins literature, some developed by legal 
economists and a few by comparative law scholars. In section four, we 
examine the hypothesis of the efficiency of the common law and its 
shortcomings, as it constitutes the most solid theoretical foundation for 
the legal origins model. Section five concludes with explicit proposals 
for more involvement by comparative law scholars. 
 
II. LEGAL FAMILIES16 
 
The relationship between the comparative law literature and the 
economic literature on legal families is replete with ironies. The legal 
origins theory relies heavily on the classifications of legal families 
devised by comparative law scholars. Yet economists have popularized 
the concept of legal families precisely when comparative lawyers have 
begun to abandon this landmark contribution of their field. 17  The 
output of the economic literature on legal origins arguably came to 
exceed that of all comparative law scholarship combined, 18  but 
comparativists have by and large ignored or strongly rebuffed the legal 
origins line of work.  
 
Comparisons among foreign legal systems, whether casual or profound, 
have a long history – and so does the idea that English law is 
significantly different from French and Roman law.19  The effort to 
                                                            
16 This section is inspired by M Pargendler, 'The Rise and Decline of Legal Families' 
(2012) 60(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 1043-1074.  
17 See fn 33-36 infra and accompanying text.  
18  D Vagts, ‘Comparative Company Law – The New Wave’, in R Schwizerl, H 
Burkert, and U Gasser (eds), Festschrift für Jean Nicolas Duey zum 65, Geburtstag 
(Schulthess 2002),  pp. 595-605, judging the recent developments in comparative 
corporate governance, inspired by the law and finance literature, as an “astonishing 
phenomenon” whose output “outdoes all of the publications in the rest of 
comparative law put together”.   
19 See, eg, Sir J Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (In Praise of the Laws of 
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extrapolate from differences between individual legal systems and 
divide the world map into a handful of “legal families” based on the 
heritage and character of the underlying legal systems is far more 
recent. This project is closely intertwined with the history of modern 
day comparative law itself, a discipline whose birth, for most scholars, 
dates back to 1900.20 As we will see, reigning conceptions of legal 
families varied  over time, which cast doubt on the reliability and 
historicity of these categories. Still, these categories are key to the 
economists’ purposes.   
  
Notions of legal families or traditions played a relatively minor role in 
comparative studies in the nineteenth century. At the time, a number 
of jurisdictions had recently acquired independence, so anti-colonialist 
sentiment often led them to view (the imposed) legal tradition as 
inherently suspect. This phenomenon was, in turn, reinforced by the 
model of economic liberalism prevailing at the time, which encouraged 
economic integration and the free flow of goods, people, and ideas to 
an extent that was not replicated until the last decades of the twentieth 
century. Nineteenth century works on "comparative legislation," as the 
field was then known, had an eminently practical orientation. Rather 
than emphasizing genetic differences among legal systems, they 
focused on paving the way for legal convergence.21  
 
The first categorizations of legal systems conceived in the nineteenth 
century had modest ambitions. They served primarily to organize the 
exposition of the laws of different jurisdictions, as in Spanish scholar 
Gumersindo de Azcárate’s study on comparative legislation.22 These 
                                                                                                                                                                           
England) (CUP 1825). 
20 See H C Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of 
Legal study & Research (CUP 1946), noting that the International Congress on 
Comparative Law held in Paris in 1900 “came to be regarded by many as the 
occasion in which modern comparative law first came into being”; K Zweigert and 
H Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts (Mohr 
Siebeck 1969):“[c]omparative law as we know it started in Paris in 1900, the year of 
the World exhibition”. 
21  See G de Azcárate, Ensayo de una Introducción al Estudio de la Legislación 
Comparada, (Revista da Legislacion 1874). 
22  Ibid, organizing his exposition of legal systems according to the ethnicity of their 
people: (i) Neo-Latin peoples, (ii) Germanic peoples (which included not only 
Germany and some of its neighbors, but also England and the United States), (iii) 
Scandinavian peoples, (iv) Slavic peoples, and (v) a residual categories for “other 
peoples of Christian-European civilizations,” including Greece, Malta and the Jonic 
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early taxonomies looked significantly different from their later 
counterparts. Take, for instance, Ernest Glasson’s pioneer 
classificatory scheme developed in his book on Marriage and Divorce.23 
Glasson’s defining criterion for grouping different jurisdictions was 
the degree of Roman law influence: (i) Spain, Portugal, Italy, and 
Romania shared a strong Roman influence; (ii) England, Russia, and 
Scandinavian countries were grouped as legal systems exempt from the 
influence of Roman law; and (iii) France and Germany belonged to a 
third category of jurisdictions that combined elements of Roman and 
barbaric inspiration. These resulting categories have little in common 
with contemporary classifications. For instance, England, Russia, and 
Scandinavian countries are now habitually classified as belonging to 
distinct groups. Perhaps more strikingly, an overarching division 
between civil law and common law jurisdictions was conspicuously 
absent from Glasson’s scheme.  
  
Glasson’s framework soon spread to the other side of the Atlantic. In 
Brazil, Clovis Bevilaqua, a professor of comparative legislation and 
future draftsman of the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, adapted Glasson’s 
classification to cover Latin American as well as European countries. 
In contrast to twentieth century authors, however, Bevilaqua did not 
classify Latin American jurisdictions as direct descendants of 
European systems, but rather as members of a fourth category of 
jurisdictions boasting original legal systems that could not possibly be 
pigeonholed into existing European groupings.24  
  
It was not until the International Congress on Comparative Law 
(Congrès international de droit comparé) held in Paris in 1900 that legal 
families came to assume a central role in the then emerging agenda of 
comparativists to make their field more scientific. Up until that point, 
comparative works typically provided short summaries of the laws of a 
large number of jurisdictions, often with the aim of instructing 
merchants about legal variation around the globe in a period marked 
by economic liberalism and growing international trade. The 
comparative law scholars present at the Congress revolted against this 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Islands. 
23 E Glasson, Le Mariage Civil et le Divorce dans l’Antiquité et dans les Principales 
Législations Modernes de l’Europe, 2nd ed (A. Durand 1880). 
24 C Bevilaqua, Resumo das Licções de Legislação Comparada sobre o Direito Privado, 2nd 
ed (Magalhães 1897). 
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prevalent model of merely collecting and juxtaposing foreign laws as a 
futile exercise unworthy of academic attention.  
 
In this context, comparativists came to view the classification of 
different jurisdictions into families – akin to the family taxonomies 
then popularized by linguistics and biology – as a more constructive 
model for the scientific aspirations of the discipline. Gabriel Tarde, a 
participant in the meeting, argued that “under this new viewpoint, the 
task of comparative law is less to indefinitely collect exhumed laws 
than to formulate a natural – that is, rational – classification of juridical 
types, branches and families of law.” 25  Moreover, legal family 
classifications held the promise of not only complementing, but also 
effectively replacing the need for effective knowledge of numerous 
legal systems. For Tarde, the right taxonomy would encompass all legal 
systems “known or to be known.”  
 
In his contribution to the Congress, Adhémar Esmein likewise 
emphasized the need to “classify the legislations (or customs) of 
different peoples, by reducing them to a small number of families or 
groups, of which each represents an original system; creating 
awareness about the historical formation, the general structure, and 
the distinctive traits of each of these systems seems to be a first, 
general, and essential part of the scientific comparative law 
education.”26 Esmein’s suggested categorization divided Western legal 
systems into groups of Latin, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, and Slavic laws.  
  
Nevertheless, despite the growing intellectual force of the legal families’ 
project, Esmein’s proposed scheme soon fell into oblivion, as the 
relevant criteria to guide such taxonomies remained highly contested. 
In 1913 Georges Sauser-Hall advanced a different classification that 
grouped legal systems according to the race of the peoples concerned. 
Ten years later, Henri Levy-Ullman also refuted Esmein’s approach as 
“terribly obsolete” and proposed a new categorization based on 
“scientifically determined affinities” among legal systems. 27  Levy-
                                                            
25 G Tarde, ‘Le Droit Comparé et la Sociologie’, in Congrès international de droit 
comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900, Procès-Verbaux des Séances et 
Documents, Librairie générale de droit de jurisprudence (1905) pp 439-40. 
26 A Esmein, ‘Le Droit Comparé et l’Enseignement du Droit’, in Congrès international 
de droit comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900, Procès-Verbaux des Séances et 
Documents, Librairie générale de droit de jurisprudence, (1905), pp 445-51. 
27  H Levy-Ullman, ‘Observation Générales sur les Communications Relatives au 
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Ullman’s approach was to group jurisdictions according to their 
dominant “sources of law”: (i) legal systems of continental Europe, 
which rely on written sources of law; (ii) legal systems of English-
language countries, which adopt the common law; and (iii) legal 
systems of Islamic countries.  
 
Meanwhile, Latin American scholars continued to rely on modified 
versions of Glasson’s classificatory scheme, which regarded their 
jurisdictions as members of a family that was distinct from that of their 
European colonizers.28 Brazilian jurist Candido Luiz Maria de Oliveira 
included Latin American countries in a category of its own. For 
Argentinean author Enrique Martinez Paz, the countries in the region, 
combined with Switzerland and Russia, formed a separate group of 
Roman-Canon-Democratic legal systems. In their comprehensive 
comparative law treatise of 1950, Pierre Arminjon, Boris Nolde, and 
Martin Wolff divided the globe into “parent systems” and “derived 
systems,” which together comprised seven different legal families of 
French, German, Scandinavian, English, Russian, Islamic, and Hindu 
jurisdictions.29   
 
Yet, the final ascendancy of legal families as one of the main 
theoretical achievements of comparative law came in the 1960s as a 
result of the work of René David, as well as of Konrad Zweigert and 
Hein Kötz. Retreating from his earlier view that the distinction 
between common law and civil law systems was of only modest 
importance,30 the French author’s celebrated opus ‘Les grands systèmes 
de droit contemporain’ divided the globe into three main families of 
Romano-Germanic, Common Law, and Socialist legal systems. This 
partition was based not only on the principal legal concepts and 
techniques employed in different jurisdictions, but also on their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Droit Privé dans les Pays Etrangers’, in Les Transformations du Droit dans les 
Principaux Pays depuis Cinquante Ans (1869-1919) (Livre du cinquantenaire de la Société 
de Législation Comparée), Librairie Générales de droit et de Jurisprudence (1923), pp 
81-108. 
28 C Luiz Maria de Oliveira, Curso de Legislação Comparada (J. Ribeiro dos Santos 
1903); E Martinez Paz, Introducción al Estudio del Derecho Civil Comparado (Imprenta 
de la Universidad 1934). 
29 P Arminjon, B Nolde and M Wolff Traité de Droit Comparé (Librairie Génerale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence 1950). 
30 R David, Traité Elémentaire de Droit Civil Comparé (Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence 1950). 
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dominant worldview and ideology.31 In doing so, however, David was 
acutely aware that categorizations were inherently arbitrary, serving 
merely “didactic ends” rather than as depictions of a “biological 
reality.”32  
 
In 1969, Zweigert and Kötz proposed another equally well-known 
classificatory scheme. 33  Exemplifying the national bias of 
comparativists when devising such taxonomies,34 the German authors 
subdivided the civil law family into three separate strands – the French, 
the German, and the Scandinavian civil law systems – thus elevating 
their country of origin as a parent of a family of its own. The three civil 
law families, together with the common law, far-Eastern law, Islamic 
law, and Hindu law families, defined the main “styles” of legal systems 
around the globe. The scheme advanced by Zweigert and Kötz was 
widely popular and subsequently came to serve as the basis for the 
large empirical literature seeking to ascertain the economic 
consequences of legal institutions. This categorization was, however, of 
relatively minor importance in their treatise, whose primary purpose 
was to redefine the study of comparative law in functional terms – an 
intellectual ambition that was  different from the legal families 
project.35  
 
The works of David and Zweigert and Kötz came to form the 
mainstream of legal family classifications, and, for some, should have 
put an end to the need for further taxonomies.36 However, studies 
seeking to supersede or refine existing legal family categorizations 
continued to emerge,37 as did some of the most sophisticated works on 
                                                            
31 R David, Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporain (Dalloz 1962). 
32 Ibid. 
33 K Zweigert and H Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des 
Privatrechts (Mohr Siebeck 1969). 
34 Y-M Laithier, Droit Comparé (Dalloz 2009). 
35 D Kennedy, ‘The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, The Methods and 
Politics of Comparative Law’, in P Legrand and R Mundary (eds), Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003), pp. 345-433: “‘[l]egal families’ and 
‘functions’ mark poles of the functional-technical spectrum for comparative law in 
the nineteen fifties”. 
36 J Langbein, ‘The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States’ (1995) 
43 American Journal of Comparative Law 545-554, arguing, with respect to legal 
family classifications, that “once René David has written, once you have Zweigert 
and Kötz on the shelf, there seems to be less reason to keep doing it”. 
37 U Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal 
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the peculiarities of different legal traditions, such as John Merryman’s 
study on the civil law38 and Mirjan Damaska’s seminal work on the 
distinct systems of legal procedure in continental and Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.39  
 
Yet, since the end of the twentieth century, a number of prominent 
scholars, no doubt inspired by the world’s increasing globalization and 
rapid legal convergence, began to challenge the continued utility of 
legal family classifications for comparative law. James Gordley has 
described the distinction between common and civil law as 
“obsolete.”40  Hein Kötz, co-author of one of the most influential of 
such taxonomies, has questioned whether the time has come to bid 
farewell to legal family classifications.41 All in all, a significant strand of 
the comparative law literature has come to believe that legal family 
distinctions are largely outmoded. 42 This literature shows that legal 
families are problematic, variant and subject to many different 
classifications in comparative law. We suggest that it explains why 
comparativists are conceptually skeptical of the legal origins theory. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Systems’ (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 5-44, p 9, advocating a new 
categorization of jurisdictions as subject to the rule of professional law, the rule of 
political law, or the rule of traditional law; V Palmer ‘Introduction to the Mixed 
Jurisdictions’, in V V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal 
Family (CUP 2001), pp. 3-6. (defending a view that mixed jurisdictions form a legal 
family of their own); D Whitman, ‘Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in 
Comparative Law’ (2007) 117 Yale Law Journal 340-406, arguing that the distinction 
of consumerism and producerism as categories are “more revealing” than legal 
families in analyzing modern legal systems.  
38 J  Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press 1969). 
39 M Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the 
Legal Process (Yale University Press 1986). 
40 J Gordley, 'Common Law und Civil Law: eine überholte Unterscheidung' (2003) 3 
Zeitschrift für europäisches Privaterecht 498-518. 
41 H Kötz, 'Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre?' (2008) 3 Zeitschrift für europasches 
Privatrecht 6493-505. 
42 See, eg, B Fauvarque-Cosson and A-J Kerhuel ‘Is Law an Economic Contest? 
French Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic 
Analysis of Law’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 811-32, p 829: “the 
legal origins thesis bases its analysis on a classification of legal systems divided into 
legal families which is now by and large outdated”; H Spamann, ‘Contemporary 
Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law’(2009) 6 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1813-877, p 1815, describing the growing 
consensus among sophisticated comparativists that there are “there are few if any 
relevant differences between common and civil law today”.  
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III. THE CRITIQUES TO THE LEGAL ORIGINS THEORY 
 
The legal origins theory has proved to be as controversial as it is 
influential. Despite its popularity, the criticisms both of its 
methodology and conclusions are numerous – in fact, too numerous to 
be addressed in full here. We will focus on only a few of the most 
conspicuous challenges to this line of inquiry. First, there is a growing 
literature, produced mostly by French scholars, that simply rejects 
efficiency as a relevant metric to compare different legal systems. 
Although specifically directed to the legal origins theory, the criticism 
here is broader in nature; it applies to the entire field of law and 
economics and to any kind of economic-oriented argument. 43 
Researchers affiliated with this approach will invariably conclude that 
efficiency or other economic measures are inadequate in describing 
and evaluating legal regimes.44  
 
Second, other authors have attacked the legal origins literature as a 
defective exercise in comparative law due to the irrelevance or fluidity 
of legal family categories as well as the inherent difficulties in 
measuring legal institutions. 45  Legal family categories were without 
exception designed by lawyers and for lawyers. The defining criteria of 
such classifications – such as the “sources of law” – are of interest to 
legal scholars and lawyers, but hardly relevant for most questions that 
                                                            
43 For an English overview, see C Ménard and B du Marais, ‘Can We Rank Legal 
Systems According to their Economic Efficiency?’(2008) 26 Washington University 
Journal of Law and Policy 55-80. Other critiques in the same venue include R 
Aguilera and C Williams, ‘Law and Finance: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and 
Important’(2009) 9 Brigham Young University Law Review 1413-434, proposing 
economic sociology as a better methodology; and P Legrand ‘Econocentrism’ (2009) 
59(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 215-22. See response by G Hadfield, ‘The 
Strategy of Methodology: The Virtues of Being Reductionist for Comparative Law’ 
(2009) 59(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 223-235. 
44  For a different perspective, see H P Glenn, ‘Are Legal Traditions 
Incommensurable?’ (2001) 49(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 133-45; M 
Siems, ‘Numerical Comparative Law - Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Order to 
Reduce Complexity?’ (2005) 13 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative 
Law  521-40; and H Spamann, ‘Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for 
Comparative Law? ’ (2009) 57(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 797-810. See 
also M Siems, ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147-64. 
45 See, among others, A B Engelbrekt (2010) ‘Toward an Institutional Approach to 
Comparative Economic Law?’, in A B Engelbrekt and J Nergelius (eds), New 
Directions in Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2010), pp 213-51. 
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are the object of social science research.46 In fact, these categorizations 
had didactic purposes, and did not seek to accurately describe the laws 
of affiliate legal systems. Zweigert and Kötz go so far as to urge 
comparatists to “ignore the affiliate [legal system] and concentrate on 
the parent system.”47 Relatedly, comparative law scholars have always 
regarded the defining criteria for legal family categories, as well as the 
classification of individual countries under one group or another, as 
highly problematic, which arguably makes them unbefitting variables 
for e.g. statistical regressions or social science explanations more 
broadly.48  
 
Third, the use of legal families by economists relies on the assumption 
that such groupings have deep historical (and exogenous) roots. It is 
revealing that what comparative lawyers call “legal families” economists 
have come to term “legal origins,” an expression that highlights the 
purported historicity of these categories that is key to their proponents’ 
purposes. Not only did the relevant classifications undergo significant 
change over time, but the comparativists who designed them explicitly 
recognized that their taxonomies were temporally grounded. David’s 
famous work was translated into English as “Major Legal Systems in 
the World Today,”49 while Zweigert and Kötz expressly warned that any 
taxonomy “depends on the period of which one is speaking,” so that 
“the division of the world’s legal systems into families, especially the 
attribution of a system to a particular family, is susceptible to alteration 
as a result of legislation or other events and can, therefore, be only 
temporary.”50  
 
Moreover, the view of law as a “politically neutral endowment” 
reflected on the legal origins literature has also come under attack.51 
                                                            
46 D Whitman, ‘Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law’ 
(2007) 117 Yale Law Journal 340-406. 
47 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, vol. 2 (Clarendon 
Press 1987), p 64 suggesting that scholars interested in the Romanistic tradition 
focus exclusively on France and Italy, as “[t]he legal systems of Spain and Portugal 
(…) do not often call for or justify very intensive investigation”.   
48 See M Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law’ 
(2007) 52(1) McGill Law Journal 55-82.     
49 Emphasis added, R David and J Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: 
An Introduction to Comparative Study of Law, 3d ed (Stevens 1985). 
50 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, vol. 2 (Clarendon 
Press 1987), p 66. 
51 C Milhaupt and K Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About 
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Some of the most significant differences in corporate governance and 
capital market development across jurisdictions are arguably due to 
context-specific political developments in the twentieth century. 52 
There is also evidence that at least some countries voluntarily picked 
and chose their rules of commercial law ever since the nineteenth 
century, thereby challenging the view that legal origins are necessarily 
exogenous.53 
 
Fourth, the studies on the relationship between law and development 
carry an implicit assumption that law and legal institutions matter a 
great deal for economic outcomes. 54  Inevitably this is an empirical 
question. Not surprisingly, many authors have focused on the 
particular econometrics to criticize the legal origins literature. 55  A 
number of studies have provided countervailing empirical evidence to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago 
Press 2008).  
52 See, eg, M Roe, ‘Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets’(2006) 120 
Harvard Law Review 460-527; M Pargendler, 'State Ownership and Corporate 
Governance' (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2917-973. 
53  M Pargendler, 'Politics in the Origins: The Making of Corporate Law in 
Nineteenth-Century Brazil' (2012) 60(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 805-
850. 
54 F Cross, ‘Law and Economic Growth’ (2002) 80(7) Texas Law Review 1737-775. 
55  See, among others, B Ahlering and S Deakin, ‘Labor Regulation, Corporate 
Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity’(2007) 41 
Law and Society Review 865-903; J Armour, et al., "How do Legal Rules Evolve? 
Evidence from Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker 
Protection' (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 579-630; J Armour, S 
Deakin, P Sarkar, A Singh and M M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock 
Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’(2009) 6(2) 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 343-80; J Armour, S Deakin, V Mollica, and M M 
Siems ‘Law and Financial Development: What We are Learning from Time-Series 
Evidence’(2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1435-500; H Spamann, 'The 
“Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited' (2009) 23 Review of Financial Studies 467-86; 
see H Spamann, 'Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative 
Law?' (2009) 7(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 5797-810; H Spamann, (2010) 
‘Legal Origins, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement’(2010) 
166(1) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 171-77; M Siems and S 
Deakin, ‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present, and Future Research’ (2010) 
166(1) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 120-40; E Helland and J 
Klick, ‘Legal Origins and Empirical Credibility’, in M Faure and J Smits (eds), Does 
Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth  (Intersentia 2011), pp 99-113; and D 
Klerman P Mahoney, H Spamann, and M Weinstein, ‘Legal Origin or Colonial 
History?’(2011) 3(2) Journal of Legal Analysis 379-409. 
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challenge the claim that common law is superior to civil law from an 
economic standpoint. These works identify the advantages of civil law 
over common law institutions, 56  show reversals in the patterns of 
financial development across legal traditions over time,57 or find that 
other variables are superior to legal origins in predicting economic 
outcomes.58  
  
Last but not least, even if one was to accept the conclusions of 
econometric studies showing the purported advantages of common law 
institutions, the inquiry would remain incomplete without identifying 
the mechanisms and channels that account for the superiority of the 
common law system – an issue to which we now turn.  
 
IV. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LEGAL FAMILIES59 
 
The legal origins literature suggests that legal systems stemming from 
the English common law have institutions that are more conducive to 
                                                            
56 See, eg, N Lamoreaux and J-L Rosenthal (2005) ‘Legal Regime and Contractual 
Flexibility: A Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the 
United States during the Era of Industrialization’(2005) 7(1) American Law and 
Economics Review 28-61; T Guinanne R Harris, N Lamoreaux, J-L Rosenthal, 
‘Putting the Corporation in its Place’ (2007) 8(3) Enterprise and Society 687-729.   
57  R Rajan and L Zingales,‘The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century’ (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 
5-50; A Musacchio, ‘Law and Finance c. 1900’(2010) NBER working paper, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648016. 
58  See, eg, D Acemoglu, D Cantoni, S Johnson, and J A Robinson, ‘The 
Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution’(2011) 101(7) American 
Economic Review 3286-3307; D Berkowitz, K Pistor and J-F Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47(1) European Economic 
Review 165-95; A Licht, C Goldschmidt and S H Schwartz ,‘Culture, Law, and 
Corporate Governance’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 229-
55; M Roe, ‘Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets’(2006) 120 Harvard 
Law Review 460-527; D Klerman P Mahoney, H Spamann, and M Weinstein, ‘Legal 
Origin or Colonial History?’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Legal Analysis 379-409. 
59 This section develops economic arguments suggested by N Garoupa and C Gómez 
Ligüerre, ‘The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law’ (2011) 29 Boston 
University International Law Journal  287-355; N Garoupa and C Gómez Ligüerre, 
'The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency' (2012) 40 (2) Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 307-340; N Garoupa and C Gómez Ligüerre, 
'The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families' (2012) 29(4) 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 671-693; and also M. Pargendler 'The Rise and 
Decline of Legal Families' (2012) 60(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 1043-
1074.  
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economic development than those of civil law jurisdictions (in 
particular, those of French origin).60 The mechanism for the economic 
superiority of the common law versus French civil law is however 
intrinsically convoluted and debatable. 61  In searching for a sound 
theoretical background, some economists have related to two standard 
discussions within law and economics, namely the efficiency 
hypothesis of the common law and the inferiority of legislation. 
  
The so-called efficiency of the common law has generated discussion 
among legal economists quite early in the law and economics 
literature. 62  According to Richard Posner’s early work, there is an 
implicit economic logic to the common law. In his view, the doctrines 
of the common law provide a coherent and consistent system of 
incentives which induce efficient behavior, not merely in  markets, but 
in all social contexts (the so-called implicit markets). For example, as 
Posner claims, the common law reduces transaction costs to favor 
market transactions when that is appropriate. Quite naturally, Posner 
recognized that not all doctrines in common law are economically 
justifiable or even easy to understand from an efficiency perspective.63   
 
Posner’s hypothesis of the efficiency of the common law begged for a 
more detailed explanation from the start. In particular, it lacked a more 
explicit mechanism for why the common law  should be efficient. A 
remarkable literature emerged in order to find such mechanism. Law 
and economics scholars proposed different explanations, which are 
based essentially on evolutionary models that identify the forces that 
have shaped the common law to generate efficient rules.64  
 
                                                            
60 See the extensive discussion by K Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: the Rule of Law 
and Economic Development (Brookings Institution 2006); also, M Roe and J I Siegel, 
‘Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal 
Traditions in the Law-Growth Nexus’ (2009) 47(3) Journal of Economic Literature 
781-800.  
61 For an attempt to identify the channels for the relationship between legal origin 
and financial development, see T Beck, A Demirgüç-Kunt and R Levine, ‘Law and 
Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?’(2003) 31(4) Journal of Comparative 
Economics 653-75. 
62 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 8th edn (Aspen 2011).  
63 Ibid.  
64 Evolutionary theory models is the denomination used by P Rubin, ‘Micro and 
Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand’ (2005) 13 Supreme Court Economic 
Review 19-34. 
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One explanation for the efficiency of the common law is that judges 
themselves have a preference for efficiency. 65  Another possible 
justification is that efficiency is promoted by the prevalence of 
precedent (more efficient rules are more likely to survive through a 
mechanism of precedent).66 A further argument relies on the incentives 
to bring cases and the role of court litigation (since inefficient rules are 
not welfare maximizing). 67  Nevertheless, the precise nature of the 
mechanism that justifies the efficiency hypothesis is problematic, even 
taking these early explanations into account (these explanations were 
produced almost immediately after the publication of Richard Posner’s 
thesis).68 
 
The search for a more convincing setup for the efficiency of the 
common law hypothesis has sparked important academic work. This 
literature essentially looks at how litigation improves the law, or some 
specific legal doctrines, taking into consideration that only a self-
selected number of cases is actually litigated (that is, not all conflicts 
get to be solved by courts; common law evolution depends on which 
conflicts are addressed by courts while legal stagnation is expected for 
those areas that are not addressed by courts). 69  In particular, the 
                                                            
65 R Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal 
Studies 103-40. 
66 P Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6(1) Journal of Legal Studies 
51-63. 
67 G Priest, ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’ (1977) 
6(1) Journal of Legal Studies 65-82. 
68 See N Gennaioli and A Shleifer, 'The Evolution of Common Law' (2007) 115(1) 
Journal of Political Economy 43-68; N Gennaioli and A Shleifer, 'Overruling and 
the Instability of Law' (2007) 35(2) Journal of Comparative Economics 309-28; and T 
J Miceli, ‘Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent’ (2009) 
38(1) Journal of Legal Studies 157-76.  
69 See J Goodman, ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law’ 
(1978) 7(2) Journal of Legal Studies 393-406; R Cooter and L Kornhauser, ‘Can 
Litigation Improve the Law without the Help of Judges’ (1980) 9(1) Journal of Legal 
Studies 139-63; P Terrebonne, ‘A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law’ 
(1981) 10(2) Journal of Legal Studies 397-407; P Rubin, Business Firms and the Common 
Law: The Evolution of Efficient Rules, (Praeger 1983); G von Wagenheim, ‘The 
Evolution of Judge-made law’(1993) 13(4) International Review of Law and 
Economics 381-411; V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal 
Remedies: A Dynamic Model’(2003) 116(3-4) Public Choice 419-33; B Depoorter, V 
Fon and F Parisi, ‘Litigation, Judicial Path-dependence, and Legal Change’ (2005) 
20(1) European Journal of Law and Economics 43-56; V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Judicial 
Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis’ (2006) 26(4) International 
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efficiency of the common law is unequivocally related to the 
observation that litigation follows private interests. Presumably, bad 
rules are challenged more often than good rules, so naturally court 
intervention will improve the overall quality of the law. However, this 
line of reasoning is not without problematic shortcomings. It could be 
that the subset of cases that are actually litigated is not representative 
enough to trigger the necessary improvements, hence biasing evolution 
of legal rules against efficiency. 70  Furthermore, the emergence of 
efficiency in common law depends on a number of factors in the 
evolutionary mechanism, namely initial conditions, path dependence 
and random shocks.71  
 
The literature on the efficiency of the common law that followed 
Posner’s hypothesis is not comparative in nature, but effectively looks 
at judge-made law. The Posnerian hypothesis does not set a common 
law system in a better position than a civil law system in the evolution 
towards efficient rules. It does not provide a convincing framework to 
argue that judicial precedent is a superior way to promote an efficient 
solution than a statutory rule precisely because the focus is on judge-
made law. Under the common law reasoning, bad decisions are 
overruled, in the same way that under civil law, bad statutes can be 
effectively corrected by the judiciary. 72  There is no (theoretical or 
empirical) basis to assert that courts and juries are in a better position 
in common law than in civil law jurisdictions to calculate the 
consequences of their decisions more appropriately than the 
government. Moreover, that judge-made law can be better understood 
as a set of rules designed to maximize economic efficiency, as Judge 
Posner proposed, is not an exclusive feature of common law 
jurisdictions.  
 
If the Posnerian hypothesis is true, at least in the long run, rules that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Review of Law and Economics 519-35; F Parisi and V Fon, The Economics of 
Lawmaking (OUP 2009). 
70 G Hadfield, ‘Biases in the Evolution of Legal Rules’ (1992) 80 Georgetown Law 
Journal 583-616. 
71 M Roe, ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’(1996) 109 Harvard Law 
Review 641-671. In fact, more recently, A Shleifer, The Failure of Judges and the Rise 
of Regulators (MIT Press 2012) defends the rise of regulators in common law 
jurisdictions largely reflects the failure of judges in providing efficient social control. 
72 See, for example, V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: 
A Dynamic Analysis’ (2006) 26(4) International Review of Law and Economics 519-35. 
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do not promote efficient results should be repealed in any legal system 
(in the short run, transaction costs might explain why inefficient laws 
survive). Therefore, the central question is not whether one legal 
family or the other promotes an economic efficiency solution, but 
which of these two main legal families reaches the adequate result 
(always from the economic perspective) at a lower cost in terms of 
delays and opportunity costs. From a cost perspective solely, it is not 
clear that the type of cost attached to general axiomatic legal solutions, 
characteristic for civil law approaches, is necessarily higher than 
litigation costs incurred in the approach developed by common law. 
 
The mere Posnerian efficiency hypothesis of the common law cannot 
alone support the conclusion that lawmaking by legislation is 
necessarily less efficient than court intervention. One of the main 
arguments for the superiority of judge-made law is that private 
interests are more likely to capture the legislature than the courts, 
although such argument is debatable at the theoretical as well as at the 
empirical level.73 In fact, there is no systematic evidence that rent-
seeking is more persistent with the legislature than with the courts, 
since demand and supply conditions are fundamentally different.74 
                                                            
73  See M Crew and C Twight, ‘On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice 
Perspective’ (1990) 66 Public Choice 15-36, arguing that common law is less subject 
to rent-seeking than statute law; and P Rubin, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’(1982) 
11 Journal of Legal Studies 205-33, arguing that both are influenced by private 
interests to advance their goals. The most devastating criticism is G Tullock, The 
Case Against the Common Law (Carolina Academic Press 1997) and G Tullock, ‘Rent-
Seeking and the Law’, in C K Rowley (ed), The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, vol. 
5 (2005), pp 184–95. See also B Luppi and F Parisi, ‘Litigation and Legal Evolution: 
Does Procedure Matter?’(2012) 152 Public Choice 181-201; and J Biser, ‘Law-and-
Economics: Why Gordon Tullock Prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of 
Wellington, and Why He May End Up on St. Helena’(2014) 158 Public Choice 261-
279. 
74 See, among others, W Landes and R Posner, ‘The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest Group Perspective’ (1975) 18  Journal of Law and Economics 875-901; R. 
Tollison and W M Crain ‘Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective’ 
(1979) 8(1) Journal of Legal Studies 165-175; W M Crain and R Tollison, ‘The 
Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of Government’ (1979) 8(3) Journal 
of Legal Studies 555-67; F McChesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the 
Economic Theory of Regulation’ (1987) 16(1) Journal of Legal Studies 101-18, 
discussing several theories of capture in rulemaking; T Merrill, 'Does Public Choice 
Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?' (1997) 21(1) Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 219-30; and T Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith' (1997) 
22(4) Law and Social Inquiry 959-98. 
2014]                     Law and Economics of Legal Families    56 
Moreover, courts and legislators have their own goals in terms of 
enhancing their influence, which complicates the potential effect of 
private interests in lawmaking.75 
 
The more adversarial nature of litigation in common law than in civil 
law could well generate more rent-seeking and more rent dissipation in 
the process of rulemaking. 76  Furthermore, given the growing 
predominance of statutes in common law jurisdictions, the inevitable 
conclusion would be that the overall efficiency has been reduced. This 
conclusion seems to be reinforced by the argument that the efficiency 
of the common law is not really demand-side induced (i.e., through the 
incentives provided by litigation), but supply-side induced. The 
historical competition between common law and equity courts was the 
driving force; once these courts were merged and monopoly had been 
achieved, the efficiency forces had lost stimulus. 77  Nevertheless, a 
similar historical competition between royal, guild, and ecclesiastical 
courts existed in civil law jurisdictions. 
 
Notice that the relative efficiency of judge-made versus statutory law by 
itself does not provide a good framework to justify the superiority of the 
common law system as compared to the civil law system. First, statutes 
are important in common law jurisdictions and many key areas of private 
law such as torts are essentially case law in civil law jurisdictions. Second, 
the biases of legislation and litigation are not qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar in both legal systems due to procedural and 
substantive differences. As argued by scholars, the efficiency hypothesis 
of the common law, coupled with the alleged bias of legislation for private 
capture, is insufficient to support the argument that French civil law is 
necessarily inferior to the common law from an economic perspective.78 
                                                            
75 See discussion by A C Pritchard and T J Zywicki, ‘Finding the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation’(1999) 77 
North Carolina Law Review 409-521. For a very interesting comparison between 
lawmakers and its influence under English and French systems, see J W F Allison, 
A Continental Distinction in the Common Law. A Historical and Comparative Perspective 
on English Public Law (Clarendon Press 1996). 
76  T J Zywicki, ‘Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock’s 
Critique’ (2008) 135(1-2) Public Choice 35-53. 
77 T J Zywicki, ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law’ (2003) 97 
Northwestern Law Review 1551-633. A more comprehensive discussion is provided 
by D Klerman, 'Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law' 
(2007) 74(4) University of Chicago Law Review 1179-226. 
78 See N Garoupa and C Gómez Ligüerre, ‘The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the 
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In fact, as noted in the literature, the traditional Posnerian analysis 
could be transposed to French civil law in many ways and multiple 
forms. It could be argued that general law (code) is more efficient than 
specific statutory interventions (potentially prone to more capture). It 
could be also said that bottom-up law (for example, case law pilling up 
under general code provisions) is more appropriate than top-down law 
(including very detailed code provisions as well as specific statutes). 
Nothing in the discussion so far makes the argument unique to 
common law or provides a complete framework to derive implications 
for comparative law. 
 
The pro-market bias of the common law (the idea of some Hayekian 
bottom up efficiencies in the English legal system and top down 
inefficiencies in the French legal system79 ) might be an important 
argument in its favor, but the existence of some anti-market bias in 
French law is debatable. It could be that traditional French legal 
scholarship has been less concerned with efficiency arguments. 
However, the lack of interest exhibited by French legal scholars 
concerning pro-market legal policies (which might be explained by 
cultural reasons) does not constitute strong evidence that French law 
itself is inefficient.80  
 
Even the thesis that French law is less effective than the common law 
in protecting property rights from state predation is subject to 
dispute. 81  The current formal models developed to explain these 
differences are the object of serious criticism.82 Stability of the law is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Common Law’ (2011) 29 Boston University International Law Journal 287-355. 
79  See P Mahoney, ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be 
Right’ (2001) 30(2) Journal of Legal Studies 503-25. 
80 See discussion by C Valcke, ‘The French Response to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report’ (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 197-217. See also B 
Fauvarque-Cosson and A-J Kerhuel, ‘Is Law an Economic Contest? French 
Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of 
Law’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 811-32.  
81 See, for two different perspectives, S Djankov, E Glaeser, F López-de-Silanes, 
and A Shleifer, ‘The New Comparative Economics’ (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 595-619; and B Arruñada, ‘Property Enforcement as Organized Consent’ 
(2003) 19(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 401-44. 
82 For the economic models, see E L Glaeser and A Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the 
Regulatory State’ (2001) 41(2) Journal of Economic Literature 401-25; and E L Glaeser 
and A Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’(2002) 117(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193-230. 
For discussion, see F Cross, ‘Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law’ (2007) 15(1) 
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another possible argument to favor judge-made law with deference to 
precedent against systematic and chaotic legislative production. In this 
respect, however, the existence and importance of dissenting opinions 
– which are pervasive in the United States, but absent in France – 
cannot be seen as a contribution to the stability of the law. 
Furthermore, empirically it is not clear that case law is more stable and 
less ambiguous than legislation.83 Another possibility is the enhanced 
willingness in common law jurisdictions to allow choice of law. 
However, globalization of business transactions has exerted enormous 
pressure for change in civil law jurisdictions in this respect. Overall, it 
might well be that the common law is more efficient and positively 
correlated with positive economic outcomes, but the causation is 
definitely under-theorized to a larger extent.84  
 
Furthermore, the competition between common law and civil law in a 
hybrid system does not provide an empirical answer as to which legal 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Supreme Court Economic Review  21-59; D Klerman and P Mahoney, ‘Legal Origin?’ 
(2007) 35 Journal of Comparative Economics 278-93; M Roe, ‘Juries and the Political 
Economy of Legal Origin’ (2007) 35(2) Journal of Comparative Economics 294-308; 
H Rosenthal and E Voeten, ‘Measuring Legal Systems’ (2007) 35(4) Journal of 
Comparative Economics 711-28; G Hadfield, ‘The Levers of Legal Design: 
Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law’ (2008) 36(1) Journal of 
Comparative Economics 43-73; R Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal 
Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Comparative Law’ (2009) 
57(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 765-97; C Milhaupt, ‘Beyond Legal 
Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy – Implications for Policy’ 
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system prevails in the long-run (since we would expect the most 
efficient legal system to be chosen by the relevant legal actors in a 
hybrid system). Finally, even if common law systems were more 
conducive to economic growth, the question of how to move from one 
to the other remains largely unaddressed. Legal culture, rent-seeking, 
and the accumulated human capital raise the costs of such 
transplantation.85 
 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
 
This Article discussed the role of legal families in the comparative law 
and in the economic literature. We have summarized the traditional 
approach taken by comparativists and the different perspective taken 
by economists. While mainstream comparative law has lost interest in 
legal families to a large extent, economists have used these categories 
to explain the cross-country variation, not only in the depth of 
financial markets, but also in other factors and institutions relevant for 
economic development. The significant criticism faced by the legal 
origins theory from both conventional comparativists and economists 
only underscores the importance of this literature.  
 
The economic literature has identified six factors to explain why a legal 
system could matter for economic growth: (1) the costs of identifying 
and applying efficient rules; (2) the system’s ability to restrain rent-
seeking in rule formulation and application; (3) the cost of adapting 
rules to changing circumstances; (4) the transaction costs to parties 
needing to learn the law; (5) the ease of contracting around rules; and 
(6) the costs of transitions between systems.86 How these six factors 
relate in a meaningful way to legal families is largely under-theorized 
and generally unanswered.  
 
Yet, the premise of the economic superiority of the common law is 
now the model for legal reform embodied by the Doing Business 
reports promoted by the World Bank.87 Nevertheless, without a better 
understanding of the relationship between legal traditions and 
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economic outcomes, there are good reasons to be skeptical about the 
legal origins theory as well as the Doing Business reports and related 
prescriptions that they have inspired.88 
 
Statistical analysis seems to show consistent patterns by which a 
distinction between common and civil law matters for economic 
development. Extensive critique has challenged the empirical 
methodology. Still, in our view, there is no clear robust theory for the 
legal origins account, that is, the allegedly consistent patterns 
suggested by LLSV have not been fully explained. Law seems to matter 
for growth, and legal institutions are regarded as important by 
economists. Therefore, a sound theory is needed. Effective legal 
policymaking cannot possibly be based on mere statistical patterns; it 
requires a deep understanding of causation mechanisms. 
Comparativists should get involved in that discussion instead of 
avoiding engagement based on the prevailing skepticism about legal 
families.
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